The Case against a Nondelegable Duty on Owners to Prevent Fair Housing Act Violations by Dixon, Joshua W.
The Case Against a Nondelegable Duty on Owners to
Prevent Fair Housing Act Violations
Joshua W. Dixont
Imagine that the owner of a residential investment property hires
a broker to find tenants for the property. The owner specifically in-
structs the broker not to discriminate in the selection of tenants, and
takes affirmative steps to ensure that the broker does not do so. With-
out the owner's knowledge, the broker discriminates while selecting
tenants. Should the owner be liable as a matter of law for the compen-
satory damages caused by the broker's discrimination? This Comment
argues that the owner should not.
The Fair Housing Ace ("FHA," "Act," or "Title VIII") creates a
federal cause of action for discrimination in housing. Courts generally
apply traditional principles of agency law4 to determine whether the
owners of a property (or the owners of a brokerage firm5) are liable
t B.A. 1995, Wake Forest University; J.D. 2002,The University of Chicago.
1 This hypothetical is based on the facts of Walker v Crigler, 976 F2d 900, 901-02 (4th Cir
1992).
2 This Comment argues only that owners should not be held liable on the basis of a non-
delegable duty. Because every federal court to hear the issue has considered the standard of li-
ability to be either traditional agency principles or a nondelegable duty, the Comment will not
consider the possibility that innocent owners should not be liable at all for their employees' dis-
crimination. Moreover, although it advocates adoption of traditional agency principles, this
Comment does not discuss in detail whether owners should be held liable as a matter of law on
the basis of the "apparent authority" or "aided in the agency" exceptions to the scope-of-
authority rule. For an explanation of these exceptions, see notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
While these concepts may become more relevant in Title VIII litigation if the approach in this
Comment is adopted, see note 145, it appears that no federal court has addressed the "aided in
the agency" exception in the FHA context, and very few courts have addressed "apparent au-
thority." The courts that have addressed apparent authority have found it to be a factual, rather
than legal, question. See, for example, Inland Mediation Board v City of Pomona, 158 F Supp 2d
1120,1141 n 114 (C D Cal 2001) ("Plaintiffs have ... presented evidence from which a jury could
reasonably conclude that Plaintiff Cross perceived an apparent agency relationship between the
defendants.").
3 Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub L No 90-284, 82 Stat 81, codified as
amended at 42 USC §§ 3601-31 (1994).
4 Even though the nondelegable duty is technically a species of direct, not vicarious, liabil-
ity, see Part I.B, it is discussed in the context of vicarious liability in the Restatement (Second) of
Agency. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(c) (ALI 1958). This Comment, therefore,
distinguishes between an agency approach without the concept of a nondelegable duty and a sys-
tem of liability based on the concept of a nondelegable duty. The Comment terms the former
"traditional" principles of agency law and the latter a "nondelegable duty."
5 Courts apply traditional agency principles to determine the liability of both the owner of
the property, see Cabrera v Jakabovitz, 24 F3d 372,385-91 (2d Cir 1994) (finding that the owner
of a property was vicariously liable for the damages caused by his brokers' discrimination), and
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for any compensatory damages awarded because of their employees'
housing discrimination. Under these principles, innocent owners will
be liable only if they were in an agency relationship with the employ-
ees who discriminated, and only if the discrimination occurred within
the scope of the employees' authority." This rule affords owners the
opportunity to avoid liability by instructing their employees not to
discriminate and by taking steps to ensure they do not do so, because
such actions will make it less likely that discrimination will be consid-
ered within the scope of authority.9
Under the current law, some courts determine innocent owners'
liability for compensatory damages according to an alternative theory
of liability. These courts have found that the FHA also creates in own-
ers' a nondelegable duty to ensure that their employees do not dis-
the owner of any brokerage firm that the owner of the property might have hired. See City of
Chicago v Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Center, Inc, 982 F2d 1086,1096-98 (7th Cir 1992) (find-
ing the owner of a brokerage firm vicariously liable for the damages caused by his employees'
discrimination). For ease of reference, this Comment will refer to both of these types of owners
as "owners" or "owner."
6 Punitive damages, on the other hand, are governed by separate rules. While the current
state of punitive damage law under the FHA is uncertain-see, for example, Timothy J. Moran,
Punitive Damages in Fair Housing Litigation: Ending Unwise Restrictions on a Necessary Rem-
edy, 36 Harv CR-CL L Rev 279,317-41 (2001) (arguing that punitive damages are necessary for
enforcement of the FHA)-they seem to be governed by traditional agency principles, with the
exception that, "an employer [can] not be held liable [for punitive damages] for the discrimina-
tory employment decisions of managerial [or lower-ranked] agents where these decisions are
contrary to the employer's good faith efforts to comply with civil rights laws." Alexander v Riga,
208 F3d 419, 433 (3d Cir 2000), quoting Kolstad v American Dental Association, 527 US 526, 545
(1999). A detailed discussion of punitive damages is outside the scope of this Comment.
7 Cabrera, 24 F3d at 385 ("To hold [the defendant owners] vicariously liable for [the de-
fendant brokers'] discriminatory practices, the [plaintiff] must establish that [the owners] em-
ployed [the brokers] as their agent."); Marr v Rife, 503 F2d 735, 741 (6th Cir 1974) ("The dis-
criminatory conduct of an apartment manager or rental agent is, as a general rule, attributable to
the owner and property manager of the apartment complex both under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior and because the duty to obey the law is non-delegable."); Matchmaker, 982 F2d at
1096 n 12 ("[T]he discriminatory acts of the four Matchmaker agents in this case were within the
scope of their employment."); Northside Realty Associates, Inc v United States, 605 F2d 1348,1354
(5th Cir 1979) ("Given [the agency] relationship, the sales agents' acts-clearly carried out
within the scope of their employment and for the benefit of the [owner]-could properly be im-
puted to the owner.").
8 See, for example, Cabrera, 24 F3d at 388 n 16 ("Because we decide that the [owners] are
liable for [their agents'] discrimination under traditional doctrines of respondeat superior, we do
not need to consider whether they might also be liable because landlords may have a nondelega-
ble duty not to discriminate."). The rules of vicarious liability are slightly more complex than this
general statement. See notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
9 The rule would afford owners only the possibility, not the certainty, of avoiding liability.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 230 ("An act, although forbidden, or done in a forbidden
manner, may be within the scope of employment.") (emphasis added).
10 The nondelegable duty arises against both the owner of the property-see Walker, 976
F2d at 904-05 (holding that the owner of a property has a nondelegable duty to prevent dis-
crimination by a broker)-and the owner of any brokerage firm the owner of the property might
have hired-see Holley v Crank, 258 F3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir 2001) (holding that the owner of a
brokerage firm has a nondelegable duty to prevent discrimination by a broker). There may be
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criminate against prospective tenants." This second theory of liability
holds owners liable as a matter of law for any compensatory damages
awarded because of their employees' discrimination. Owners face li-
ability in every case, even if they instructed their employees not to dis-
criminate.
2
The nondelegable-duty approach to owner liability misinterprets
the FHA. First, the text does not reveal a congressional intent to im-
pose a nondelegable duty. Second, relevant administrative regulations
counsel for the application of traditional agency principles. Third, the
early cases cited for the proposition that the Act creates a nondelega-
ble duty do not, in fact, impose the duty. And fourth, the nondelegable
duty does not advance the policies of the Act better than does liability
based on traditional agency principles.
This Comment presents the case against a nondelegable duty on
owners to prevent FHA violations. Part I discusses the difference be-
tween vicarious liability pursuant to traditional agency principles and
direct liability pursuant to a nondelegable duty. Part II examines the
difference between the two approaches as applied to FHA litigation.
Through examination of the relevant sources, Part III argues that
courts should find that the FHA does not create a nondelegable duty,
and that the courts should instead determine innocent owners' liabil-
ity according to traditional agency principles.
I. VICARIOUS AND DIREcTr LIABILITY
A claim under the FHA is similar to an action in tort. 3 In tort ac-
tions, agency law determines whether an employer will be liable for
reasons why these two types of owners should be considered distinct analytic categories, but this
Comment does not consider them.
11 See Holley, 258 F3d at 1132 ("[I]f [the defendant] owned [the company whose brokers
discriminated] at the time of the discriminatory acts at issue, he cannot relinquish the responsi-
bility for preventing such discrimination to another party."); Alexander, 208 F3d at 433 ("Here
we adopt the general rule applied by other federal courts that the duty of a landlord under the
Fair Housing Act not to discriminate in the leasing of property may not be delegated to the land-
lord's employee."); Walker, 976 F2d at 904 (holding that property owners have a nondelegable
duty to prevent discrimination); Asbury v Brougham, 866 F2d 1276, 1280 n 4 (10th Cir 1989)
("The duty of the owner... to obey the laws relating to racial discrimination is non-delegable"),
quoting Phiffer v Proud Parrot Motor Hote Inc, 648 F2d 548,552 (9th Cir 1980); Marr, 503 F2d
at 741 ("The discriminatory conduct of an apartment manager or rental agent is, as a general
rule, attributable to the owner and property manager of the apartment complex both under the
doctrine of respondeat superior and because the duty to obey the law is non-delegable.").
12 See Walker, 976 F2d at 905 (finding the owner of a property liable for damages caused
by his broker's discrimination, despite the fact that the owner instructed the broker not to dis-
criminate).
13 See Curtis v Loether, 415 US 189, 195 (1974) (holding that claims under the FHA are
"analogous to a number of tort actions recognized at common law" and therefore come under
the aegis of the Seventh Amendment).
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the unlawful acts of an employee." Agency concepts are relevant in
FHA litigation when an owner does not unlawfully discriminate
against a prospective tenant from a protected class, but has an em-
ployee who does discriminate without the owner's knowledge or con-
sent.'5 Under the FHA, courts will apply federal law to determine
whether the innocent owner is liable for the employee's discrimina-
tion. This law is adapted from the Restatement (Second) of Agency. 7
The Restatement distinguishes between a general set of rules
governing traditional agency principles of vicarious liability and a
nondelegable duty leading to direct liability. In order to comprehend
the doctrinal difference between these two approaches to compensa-
tory damages under the FHA, it is necessary first to understand them
as the Restatement presents them.
A. Vicarious Liability Pursuant to Traditional Agency Principles
Under the Restatement, a principal is one who employs an agent
to act on his or her behalf. In order for an agency relationship to ex-
ist, a principal must control, or have the right to control, the conduct
of the employee in the performance of the service for which the agent
was employed.W Because of this control, a principal is liable for dam-
ages caused by the acts of an agent committed within the scope of au-
thority.2
To be within the scope of authority, an agent's conduct must be of
the type that the agent was employed to perform and must be under-
taken with the purpose of serving the principal. 2' Even if an agent per-
forms an intentionally tortious act that the principal has specifically
14 See generally Restatement (Second) of Agency.
15 See Cabrera, 24 F3d at 385 ("To hold [the defendant owners] vicariously liable for [their
brokers'] discriminatory practices, the [plaintiff] must establish that [the owners] employed [the
brokers] as their agent.").
16 See id at 386 n 13 ("[W]hether an agency relationship exists for purposes of the Fair
Housing Act is determined under federal law.").
17 See id at 386 (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 comment b); Matchmaker, 982
F2d at 1096 n 12 (citing § 230); Dillon v AFBIC Development Corp, 597 F2d 556, 562 (5th Cir
1979) (citing § 219(1)).
18 See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1(1) ("Agency is the fiduciary relation which re-
sults from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his
behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.").
19 See id § 2(1) ("A master is a principal who employs an agent to perform service in his af-
fairs and who controls or has the right to control the physical conduct of the other in the per-
formance of the service.").
20 See id § 219 comment a ("The conception of the master's liability to third persons ap-
pears to be an outgrowth of the idea that within the time of service, the master can exercise con-
trol over the physical activities of the servant.").
21 See id § 228(1) ("Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;... [and] (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a
purpose to serve the master.").
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forbidden, the act can still be within the scope of authority. A princi-
pal's admonition to an agent to avoid particular acts, however, makes
it less likely that an intentional tort will be within the scope of author-
ity." It is usually for the jury to determine whether the agent's acts are
sufficiently tied to the employment for the principal to be held liable.24
If an agent acts without authority, the principal will generally not
be liable for the agent's torts." There are, however, a number of excep-
tions to this general rule.2 First, the "apparent authority" exception
occurs when the agent purports to exercise a power, which he or she
does not have under the employment agreement, to commit a tort, but
the plaintiff does not know that the agent lacks the authority of the
principal." Second, the "aided in the agency" exception occurs if the
agency relationship facilitates an agent in the commission of the tort.2
While these two exceptions to the scope-of-authority rule may prove
to be important in future FHA litigation," very few courts have ad-
dressed them in the FHA context."0 Third, and most important for the
FHA, is the nondelegable duty.
31
B. Direct Liability Pursuant to a Nondelegable Duty
A nondelegable duty arises when a provision of law creates an
obligation so important to the community that the employer will be li-
able for damages even if the performance of the obligation is dele-
gated to an agent acting without authority." If the duty is breached, the
employer will always be liable for the resulting harms. Technically,
then, the term "nondelegable duty" is misleading. The performance of
22 See id § 230 ("An act, although forbidden, or done in a forbidden manner, may be within
the scope of employment.").
23 See id § 230 comment c ("[T]he prohibition by the employer may be a factor in deter-
mining whether or not, in an otherwise doubtful case, the act of the employee is incidental to the
employment.').
24 See Cabrera, 24 F3d at 388-89 (reviewing the trial judge's instruction on scope of au-
thority).
25 See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219.
26 In addition to the exceptions listed in the text of this Comment, the principal will be li-
able where "[he or she] intended the conduct or consequences,... or [he or she] was negligent or
reckless." Id § 219(2).
27 Id § 219 comment e ("Clause (d) includes primarily situations in which the principal's
liability is based upon conduct which is within the apparent authority of a servant, as where one
purports to speak for his employer in defaming another or interfering with another's business.").
28 Id ("[T]he servant may be able to cause harm because of his position as agent, as where
a telegraph operator sends false messages purporting to come from third persons.").
29 See note 145.
30 See note 2.
31 Id § 219(2)(c).
32 See William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 71 at 471 (West 4th ed 1971) ("It
is difficult to suggest any criterion by which the non-delegable character of such duties may be
determined, other than the conclusion of the courts that the responsibility i'q so important to the
community that the employer should not be permitted to transfer it to another.").
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the duty can be delegated; it is the liability for a breach of the duty
that cannot33
For example, under the Restatement a landowner has a nondele-
gable duty to ensure that work on his or her land does not cause harm
to others.3 Even if a landowner exercises due care in selecting and
overseeing a contractor, the landowner will be liable for any injury to
a third party occasioned by the contractor's negligence.3 5 Because the
nondelegable duty imposes an obligation on the landowner to avoid
harm, the landowner will be liable even if the contractor caused harm
by acting outside the scope of authority.3 Unlike traditional agency
principles, the nondelegable duty does not impose a vicarious stan-
dard of care. Instead, it imposes a direct obligation to ensure that
harm does not befall another.3 7 With a nondelegable duty, the landlord
is always liable for harm that befalls another because of the acts of an
agent. 8
II. OWNER LIABILITY UNDER THE FHA
Many courts apply traditional agency principles to determine li-
ability for compensatory damages under the FHA.3 9 Under the tradi-
tional agency paradigm, owners are generally liable for damages
caused by housing discrimination by their agents acting within the
scope of authority. Some courts, however, also impose on owners a
nondelegable duty to avoid discrimination.4° Under this latter interpre-
tation of the Act, owners must compensate plaintiffs for their employ-
ees' acts of discrimination that occur in the rental or purchase of the
property, irrespective of whether the agent was acting with or without
authority.
33 See Fowler V. Harper, et al, The Law Of Torts § 26.11 at 83 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1986)
("Defendants who are under such a duty cannot, by employing a contractor, get rid of their own
duty to other people, whatever that duty may be.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
34 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 422 (ALI 1965) ("A possessor of land who entrusts
to an independent contractor ... work on the land ... is subject to the same liability as though he
had retained the work in his own hands to others on or outside of the land.").
35 See id § 422 comment c, illustration 1 ("A, the owner of a department store, employs an
independent contractor.... [T]he monitor [the contractor is constructing] is insecurely fastened,
and falls through the skylight, injuring B, a customer... .A is subject to liability to B.").
36 See id Ch 15, topic 2, Introductory Note ("[A] 'non-delegable duty' requires the person
upon whom it is imposed to answer for it that care is exercised by anyone, even though he be an
independent contractor.").
37 See Prosser, Law of Torts § 71 at 470 (cited in note 32) ("[T]he cases of 'non-delegable
duty' ... hold the employer liable for the negligence of the contractor, although he has himself
done everything that could reasonably be required of him.").
38 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 422.
39 See note 7.
40 Seenotell.
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A. Application of Traditional Agency Principles
The courts that evaluate owner liability for compensatory dam-
ages based on agency principles first consider whether the employee
who discriminated is an agent of the owner, and if so, whether the dis-
crimination occurred within the employee's scope of authority.4' Be-
cause agency and scope of authority are typically jury questions,4 the
court's role is usually limited to examining whether the facts support
the jury's findings.
In City of Chicago v Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Center, Inc,4
for example, one defendant was the CEO and sole proprietor of a real
estate brokerage firm." The CEO had established several written poli-
cies requiring his brokers to comply with fair housing laws.4' Neverthe-
less, the firm's brokers unlawfully discriminated against prospective
buyers.'" At the bench trial, the judge found that the CEO was vicari-
ously liable for the compensatory and punitive damages caused by hisS 47
employees' discrimination.
In upholding the award of compensatory damages, the court in
Matchmaker applied the traditional principles of agency law' The
41 See Cabrera, 24 F3d at 385-89 (upholding the trial court's decisions (1) to present the
question of agency to the jury and (2) to refuse to instruct the jury that the owner must actually
authorize the discrimination for it to be within the scope of authority).
42 See id.
43 982 F2d 1086 (7th Cir 1992).
44 Id at 1093.
45 Id at 1093-94.
46 Id at 1089-93 (finding that the brokers had engaged in unlawful racial steering).
47 Id at 1094.
48 Unfortunately, the opinion in Matchmaker is not a model of clarity on the issue.7There is
one sentence in the opinion that says, "[a] principal cannot free itself of liability by delegating to
an agent the duty not to discriminate." Id at 1096. While this sentence uses the language of non-
delegability, it does not mean that the court applied the nondelegability rule. Immediately pre-
ceding the quoted language the court stated:
The doctrine of respondeat superior enables the imposition of liability on a principal for the
tortious acts of his agent and, in the more common case, on the master for the wrongful acts
of his servant. As a matter of well-settled agency law, a principal may be held liable for the
discriminatory acts of his agent if such acts are within the scope of the agent's apparent au-
thority, even If [sic] the principal neither authorized nor ratified the acts.
Id (internal citations omitted). Not only is this language indubitably that of a traditional agency
analysis, it is what drives the opinion. The lower court found that the owner was liable for the
agents' discrimination despite the fact that the owner instructed them not to discriminate, a find-
ing that the court in Matchmaker upheld. Id. The finding thiat the agents' acts were within the
scope of authority (and the discussion thereof) would be superfluous if the court had been apply-
ing the nondelegability rule, because an agent does not have to be acting with authority to be li-
able under the nondelegability regime. See Part I.B. By applying the principles of traditional
agency law, the court concluded that the principal could not discharge the duty under the FHA
by instructing an agent not to discriminate under agency law, because the discrimination was
within the scope of authority. Matchmaker, 982 F2d at 1096 n 12. A rehabilitative reading of
Matchmaker's use of both the language of agency and nondelegability is that the court applied
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court first found that the evidence was sufficient to support a factual
finding that the brokers were agents of the CEO." Next, the court
found that the brokers' discrimination was within the scope of their
authority.! Because agency law provides that an owner is liable for the
compensatory damages caused by the torts of an agent committed
within the scope of authority," the court agreed with the trial judge
that the owner was liable for the plaintiffs' compensatory damages.2
B. Imposition of a Nondelegable Duty
Some courts find that the FHA imposes on owners a nondelega-
ble duty to avoid discrimination. In practical application, a nondelega-
ble duty under the FHA means that the owner is liable for compensa-
tory damages regardless of whether the employee who discriminated
was acting within the scope of authority.3 Under this theory of liability,
the owner is subject to liability for the discrimination committed by
employees against prospective or current tenants, even if the owner
specifically instructed the agent not to discriminate.' Courts find that
the FHA creates a nondelegable duty on three grounds: the text of the
FTIA, precedent interpreting the Act, and the policies embodied in Ti-
tle VIII.
1. Text.
Courts have supported their findings that the FIA imposes a
nondelegable duty on owners by relying upon the text of the Act. In
United States v Youritan Construction Company,- for example, the de-
fendants owned apartment buildings that they leased through rental
agents!' The owner's supervising manager explicitly instructed her
subordinates to show black applicants the most expensive apartments,
agency law, but found that, as a matter of law, discrimination is always within the scope of
authority. Such an interpretation of the FHA is called into question by the Court's recent pro-
nouncements in the Title VII context. See note 145.
49 Matchmaker, 982 F2d at 1097 (finding that the sales agents were agents of the company
because of the extent of the company's training and supervision of its employees).
50 Id.
51 See Part I.A.
52 Matchmaker, 982 F2d at 1098 ("Matchmaker ... is vicariously liable for the discrimina-
tory acts of its agents."). The court, however, disagreed with the trial judge's award of punitive
damages, holding that punitive damages were inappropriate absent a finding of direct culpability.
Id at 1100.
53 See Holley, 258 F3d at 1132-33 (finding the sole officer of a brokerage firm liable with-
out an inquiry into whether the rental agent who discriminated was acting within the scope of
authority); Walker, 976 F2d at 904 ("[T]he arguable conclusion that [the manager] acted outside
of the scope of her employment is irrelevant to the present case.").
54 See note 12 and accompanying text.
55 370 F Supp 643 (N D Cal 1973).
56 Id at 646.
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give them incomplete tours of the complex, and misrepresent the
availability of apartments to discourage them from applying for hous-
ing-all in violation of the FHA.7
In finding that the owner had a nondelegable duty to prevent dis-
crimination, the court examined the text of the FHA. In particular, the
court looked at a portion of the prohibition section of the Act, which
states: "It shall be unlawful to refuse to rent ... [or] otherwise make
unavailable housing, or to deny housing because of race."5' The court
interpreted the "otherwise make unavailable" language as making il-
legal "all practices which have the effect of denying dwellings on pro-
hibited grounds." In practical application, the court found, this lan-
guage creates a two-fold prohibition: one directed at acts and the
other directed at parties.6
The court found that the prohibition against discriminatory acts
targeted the imposition of even minimal obstacles to the securing of
housing, such as "more burdensome application procedures, [ delay-
ing tactics, and []various forms of discouragement. , ' The court found
the prohibition against parties, on the other hand, to provide for direct
liability against owners who failed to ensure that their managers did
not discriminate in the housing process.6 Because the language of the
Act was "as broad as Congress could have made it," 13 the court found
that Congress intended to impose on owners a nondelegable duty.A
57 Id.
58 Id at 648, quoting 42 USC § 3604(a) (1968).
59 Id.
60 Id at 649.
61 Id at 648.
62 Id ("Section 3604(a) [is also violated] by top management and owners who fail to set
forth objective and reviewable procedures for apartment application and rental.").
63 Id.
64 Id at 649 ("The duty to obey the [FHA] is non-delegable"). Although the court in Youri-
tan found that the owner has a nondelegable duty under the FHlA, it interpreted the duty in such
a narrow way that the owner may be able to fulfill it by implementing "objective and reviewable
procedural standards." Id. In other words, the duty not to discriminate is nondelegable, unless it
is, in fact, delegated. Such a finding is incompatible with the categorical nature of the nondelega-
bility rule and appears closer to a finding according to agency principles.
The court in Youritan is not alone in this view. In Walker, 976 F2d at 905 n 10, although the
court found the owner liable based on the rule of nondelegability, it balked in dicta at applying
the rule in every situation:
We do not have occasion to address the question of whether a heightened level of supervi-
sory activity on the part of a property owner could constitute reasonable fulfillment of his
duty not to discriminate, shielding him from liability for discrimination carried out by an
agent acting contrary to a specific non-discrimination program instituted by the owner.
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2. Precedent.
The first case to use the phrase "nondelegable duty" in FIA liti-
gation was United States v Real Estate Development.6 In Real Estate
Development, the defendant owned a series of apartment complexes. 1
For two years after the passage of the Act, the managers of the com-
plexes turned away a "measurable" number of black applicants based
solely on their race.67
At the bench trial, the court found that the managers had vio-
lated the FHA.6' It noted that the "managers ... as agents of the de-
fendants, are authorized to represent the defendants .... Their acts and
statements, made within the scope of their agency, are attributable to
the defendants, whose duty to comply with the law is non-delegable."'6
The court, therefore, found the defendant vicariously liable on the ba-
sis of agency principles and directly liable on the basis of his breach of
the FHA's nondelegable duty.
In making this pronouncement, the court did not examine the
text or policy of the Act, nor did it offer any rationale for its finding
that the duty created was nondelegable. Instead, the court cited only
two cases in support of its ruling: Williamson v Hampton Management
Company,° and United States v Reddoch . In these two cases the de-
fendant owners, who did not themselves discriminate, were found li-
able for their managers' discrimination.7 The court in Real Estate De-
velopment determined that these cases stand for the proposition that
the FHA imposes a nondelegable duty on owners to avoid discrimina-
tion."
3. Policy: importance of the obligation.
Courts have also justified the imposition of a nondelegable duty
on the grounds that the FHA creates an obligation so important that
65 347 F Supp 776 (N D Miss 1972) (holding that the housing discrimination committed by
resident managers was attributable to owners).
66 Id at 779.
67 Id at 780.
68 Id at 782 ("This evidence constitutes, at least, a prima facie case of racial discrimina-
tion.").
69 Id at 785.
70 339 F Supp 1146 (N D IMl 1972) (holding company liable for its management agents'
discrimination in violation of the FHA).
71 No 6541-71-P slip op (S D Ala Jan 27, 1972) (holding the owners of an apartment com-
plex liable for the FHA violations of the rental manager and her subordinates).
72 For a more detailed account of the facts of these two cases see Part III.C.2.
73 347 F Supp at 785 (citing Williamson and Reddoch for the proposition that "[t]he resi-
dent manager['s] and manager['s] ... acts and statements ... are attributable to the defendants,
whose duty to comply with the law is non-delegable").
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the owner should not be able to transfer it to another.74 In Walker v
Crigler," for example, the defendants were the owner and manager of
a rental property.76 The owner had instructed the manager not to dis-
criminate unlawfully in the rental of the property.7 In contravention of
the owner's demands, the manager refused to rent to the plaintiff
solely because she was a woman.7" The jury found that the owner was
not liable for the discrimination because it considered the discrimina-
tion to be outside the manager's scope of authority.!
The appellate court in Walker reversed, holding that the owner
was liable for compensatory damages caused by a breach of the FHAs
nondelegable duty.M The court focused on the policy of the Act,8' which
is "to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing
throughout the United States." According to the court, this statement
reveals the "overriding societal priority" of the Act's prohibitions, and
therefore justifies imposing a nondelegable duty."
The court found that forcing the owner to account for harm
caused by an employee's discrimination best fulfills the twin aims of
the Act-deterrence and compensation. Under the nondelegability
regime, "the one innocent party with the power to control the acts of
the agent, the owner of the property,... must act to compensate the
injured party for the harm, and to ensure that similar harm will not
occur in the future."'
a) Deterrence. The court implicitly found that the nondelegability
regime is more effective in deterring violations of the Act than a re-
gime based on traditional agency principles would be." Under a tradi-
tional agency regime, owners must only monitor their agents acting
with authority to avoid liability under the FHA.8' Under a nondelega-
74 See Prosser, Law of Torts § 71 at 471 (cited in note 32); Walker, 976 F2d at 904 ("In
many cases, involving issues other than housing discrimination, [ ] a finding [that the owner did
not confer on the agent the right to discriminate] would ... shield [the owner] from any liability
as principal. However, [that] is irrelevant in the present case.").
75 976 F2d 900 (4th Cir 1992).
76 Id at 901-02.
77 Id at 902 (finding that the owner had sent the manager a memorandum explicitly in-
structing her not to discriminate).
78 Id.
79 Id at 903 (noting that "[t]he jury ruled on the case against [the owner] in his favor, hold-
ing, apparently, that [the manager] was not acting in the scope of her employment when she de-
nied [plaintiff]'s attempts to rent the ... premises because she was a woman").
80 Id at 903-04.
81 Id at 904.
82 42 USC § 3601.
83 Walker, 976 F2d at 904.
84 Id at 9G4-05.
8S Id at 905 ("[W]e must hold [owners] to the specific mandates of anti-discrimination law
if the goal of equal housing opportunity is to be reached.").
86 See Part I.A.
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bility regime, on the other hand, owners are forced to monitor their
agents acting without authority to avoid FHA liability.'
To the extent that the additional monitoring and the costs it im-
poses are less burdensome than the costs of litigation and the ensuing
liability, owners, under the nondelegability rule, should choose to
monitor their agents acting without authority." This additional moni-
toring should, in theory, lead to fewer infractions of the FHA than
would exist under a traditional agency regime.'
b) Compensation. In addition, the court in Walker implicitly
found that the nondelegability rule better fulfills the compensation
policy of the Act than a traditional agency analysis.'° Under a tradi-
tional agency regime, owners are not liable for discrimination commit-
ted by agents acting without authority.9' In these situations, the ag-
grieved plaintiff would have to seek damages against the employee di-
rectly.
The nondelegability rule, unlike the traditional agency analysis,
does not examine whether the discriminatory actions were under-
taken with authority.u Instead, the owner must always compensate the
plaintiff for the employee's discriminatory acts.? Assuming that em-
ployees will, more often than owners, be unable to satisfy judgments
against them, the nondelegability regime should lead to more plain-
tiff compensation than under a traditional agency analysis.
III. THE NONDELEGABILITY RULE SHOULD BE ABANDONED
The finding that owners have a nondelegable duty to avoid dis-
crimination is an incorrect interpretation of the Act's standard of li-
ability. In determining the standard of liability under an anti-
discrimination statute, federal courts must look at the text of the act,95
the act's administrative regulations,6 precedent,? and the policy be-
87 See Part I.B.
88 See Corina R. Caplan, Note, The Decline and Recent Revival of Absolute Vicarious Li-
ability Under the Fair Housing Act, 48 Rutgers L Rev 581, 608 (1996) ("[S]uppliers will invest
more heavily in prevention under non-delegability, and less discrimination will occur than under
the agency rule.").
89 See id.
90 See Walker, 976 F2d at 904-05 (finding that, as between the innocent owner and the in-
nocent potential renter, the owner must "bear the burden of the harm caused").
91 See Part I.A.
92 See Walker, 976 F2d at 904 ("[T]he arguable conclusion that [the manager] acted outside
the scope of her employment is irrelevant in the present case.").
93 See Part I.B.
94 See Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 Yale L J 1231, 1235 (1984)
(noting that agents are "often individuals of limited means").
95 See Burlington Industries, Inc v Ellerth, 524 US 742,754 (1997) (examining the text of Ti-
tie VII in determining its standard of vicarious liability for sexual harassment).
96 See id at 755 (noting that "the EEOC has issued Guidelines governing sexual harass-
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hind the act.3 None of these sources supports the holding that the
FHA creates a nondelegable duty.
Section A of this Part will show that the text of the Act falls short
of pointing to a congressional intent to impose a nondelegable duty.
Section B will demonstrate that the administrative agency charged
with enforcing the Act has promulgated regulations that rely on tradi-
tional concepts of agency liability. Section C will argue that the early
cases do not establish that the FHA creates a nondelegable duty. Sec-
tion D will conclude that the imposition of a nondelegable duty con-
tradicts prior interpretations of other civil rights statutes and, in actual
application, does not fulfill the policies of the Act.
A. The Text of the Act Does Not Reveal a Congressional Intent to
Impose a Nondelegable Duty
The text of the FHA does not support imposition of a nondele-
gable duty. Although there are no firmly established textual criteria
for determining whether a statute imposes such a duty, the Restate-
ment delineates the conditions under which a statute will be read to
do so:
One who by statute or administrative regulation is under a duty
to provide specified safeguards or precautions for the safety of
others is subject to liability to the others for whose protection the
duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor
employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions.1°0
Courts have followed two general textual principles in determin-
ing whether a statute meets these conditions. If the statute identifies
the party on whom an obligation rests and specifically states the pre-
cautions the party must take to fulfill the obligation, courts will find a
nondelegable duty.t The FHA satisfies neither of these conditions. It
provides:
ment claims under Title VII, but they provide little guidance").
97 See id ("[Flederal courts have explored agency principles, and we find instruction in
their decisions.").
98 See Faragher v City of Boca Raton, 524 US 775,797-808 (1998) (examining the policies
of Title VII in applying a standard of liability for sexual harassment). It is commonplace for
courts also to examine the legislative history of the FHA, which provides no evidence regarding
Congress's intended standard of liability. See Kaplan, 48 Rutgers L Rev at 600 (cited in note 88)
("The legislative history of the FHA offers little revelation of Congress's intent.").
99 This Part does not argue that the language of the FHA affirmatively reveals a congres-
sional intent to apply agency principles. Instead, it only shows that the nondelegability reading is
incorrect, and that the text is unclear. For a discussion of the implications of this lack of clarity,
see note 148.
100 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 424.
101 See 41 Am Jur 2d Ind Con § 48 (1995) ("Generally, if a statute or municipal ordinance
requires one to do a certain thing or to take certain precautions for the protection of persons on
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[I]t shall be unlawful .. . [t]o refuse to sell or rent after the mak-
ing of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or
rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to
any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin. '
The language does not mention the word "owner" at all. Instead,
the focus of the Act is on prohibitions, not parties. Moreover, it does
not contain the word "duty,' '.. nor on its face does it state or imply
that the owner has a special obligation to ensure nondiscrimination in
the sale or rental of the property. In fact, the Act states no particular
affirmative obligations at all-it only prohibits particular acts. The
FHA thus fails both criteria of interpretation typically applied to de-
termine whether a statute creates a nondelegable duty.
Despite this failure, the court in Youritan found that the language
of the FHA evinced a congressional intent to impose a nondelegable
duty. The court interpreted the "otherwise make unavailable" lan-
guage as imposing on owners a nondelegable duty not to discrimi-
nate.1' 4
This interpretation is incorrect. The word "otherwise" must have
a referent; there must be something the word refers to in order for
there to be an "other." In the quoted sentence, the phrase "otherwise
make unavailable" refers to the unlawful acts, namely, "to refuse to
sell or rent ... or to refuse to negotiate." These prohibitions are each
against actions-to refuse to rent; to refuse to negotiate-not against
status as an owner. Based on the maxim of statutory interpretation
ejusdem generis,' because the referent is an active verb, the "other-
wise" should also be interpreted to prohibit only other actions, not to
impose liability on other parties who have not discriminated in viola-
tion of the Act.""
Moreover, even assuming that the court's reading is correct, it
should be rejected because it leads to an absurd result. The word "oth-
or near his or her property, such person cannot delegate that duty to an independent contractor
and be released from liability in case the contractor fails to perform it."); Christopher P. Bennett,
Note, The Buck Stops Here: Peaceable Repossession Is a Nondelegable Duty, 63 Mo L Rev 785,
788 (1998) ("Ordinarily, the language of the statute or ordinance must subject the employer to a
definite obligation.").
102 42 USC § 3604(a).
103 See General Building Contractors Association v Pennsylvania, 458 US 375, 396 (1982)
(interpreting 42 USC § 1981 not to impose a nondelegable duty and finding it instructive that
"[t]he language of the statute does not speak in terms of duties").
104 370 F Supp at 648. See also Part I.B.1.
105 "Of the same kind, class, or nature."
106 Compare Circuit City Stores Inc v Adams, 532 US 105, 115 (2001) ("Under this rule of
construction the residual clause should ... be controlled and defined by reference to the enu-
merated categories ... which are recited just before it.").
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erwise" is in only two of the six sections containing prohibitions in the
FHA.' 7 The court's reading would therefore impose a nondelegable
duty on the owner for "refus[ing] to sell or rent" on the basis of mem-
bership in a protected class, but not for "represent[ing] to [a member
of a protected class] that any dwelling is not available for inspection,
sale, or rental."' ' This result is absurd-both prohibitions target very
similar acts of discrimination-and it seems likely to have been unin-
tended by Congress; there is no reason why these two provisions
should establish different standards of liability.' Because courts
should not ascribe to Congress an intent to create unreasonable provi-
sions of law absent a clear indication,"O the Youritan reading should
not be accepted.
B. HUD Regulations Favor the Application of Agency Principles
Like the text of the Act, the administrative regulations imple-
menting the FHA do not counsel for the imposition of a nondelegable
duty. Instead, HUD's regulations indicate that the courts should apply
traditional agency principles.
The F.HA explicitly gives the Secretary of HUD the power to
administer the Act."' Pursuant to this delegation, the Secretary has
promulgated regulations interpreting the provisions of the Act and
providing for enforcement procedures"2-regulations that are entitled
to "considerable deference." 3 While HUD's regulations do not spe-
cifically interpret the Act's civil remedy to provide for traditional
agency principles, the regulations do provide for the application of
traditional agency principles in the administrative proceedings. The
fact that liability in the administrative proceedings is determined ac-
cording to traditional agency principles provides strong evidence that
the standard of liability under the civil side of the Act should also
come from the traditional agency regime.
107 See 42 USC § 3604(a), (f)(1). Section 3604(0(1) states that it shall be unlawful to "dis-
criminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer
or renter because of a handicap."
103 Compare 42 USC § 3604(a) with 42 USC § 3604(d).
109 Compare Green v Bock Laundry Machine Co, 490 US 504,528-30 (1989) (Scalia con-
curring) (interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) against the plain meaning of the text
of the rule, where the absurd result was likely unintended).
110 See Cass County v Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 US 103,112 (1998) ("In-
deed, because such congressional purpose would be unreasonable, Congress would have to
clearly manifest such a contrary purpose.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
111 42 USC § 3608.
112 See 24 CFR §§ 1.1 et seq (2000).
113 Harris v Itzhaki, 183 F3d 1043,1052 (9th Cir 1999). See also Chevron USA, Inc v Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 US 837, 843 (1984) (finding that if "Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue ... [t]he question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute").
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The FHA provides that claimants may bring either a civil action
or an administrative claim. HUD's regulations regarding who may
be sued in an administrative FHA claim have historically provided
that "[a] complaint may [ ] be filed against any person who directs or
controls, or has the right to direct or control, the conduct of another
person ... if that other person [is] acting within the scope of his or her
authority as [an] employee or agent......
The regulation clearly limits the conditions under which an inno-
cent owner may be subject to liability for the acts of an employee-
the owner must either direct or control, or have the right to direct or
control, the conduct of the employee, and the employee must be act-
ing within the scope of authority. These two requirements map those
of an agency analysis.
6
114 See 42 USC § 3610 (administrative actions); § 3613 (civil actions).
115 24 CFR § 103.20 (1999) (repealed). The new language provides that "the Assistant Sec-
retary will serve notice on any person who directs and controls, or has the right to direct or con-
trol, the conduct of another who is involved in a fair housing complaint." 24 CFR § 103.202(b)
(2000). In Holley, 258 F3d at 1131 n 1, the Court interpreted the amendment as making no sub-
stantive change to the old language. ("Absent any indication that HUD intended to narrow li-
ability under the new regulations, we find the previous language instructive regarding the poten-
tial scope of liability."). Indeed, the amendment was promulgated pursuant to former President
Bill Clinton's directive to administrative agencies to use plain language in their regulations. Plain
Language in Government Writing: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, 63 Fed Reg 31885 (1998). HUD noted specifically that pursuant to this directive, it
would "[a]void surplus words and technical legal jargon." Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Fair Housing Complaint Processing: Plain Language Revision and Reorganization,
64 Fed Reg 18538 (1999). In addition, it stated that the amendment "[d]oes not change the sub-
stance of the existing... regulations." Id at 18539.
116 In addition, HUD's comments on the regulation indicate that liability should be deter-
mined by traditional agency principles. In fact, the nondelegability approach was considered but
rejected in promulgating § 103.20. HUD's proposed rule on the standard of liability under the
Act initially omitted the reference to "scope of authority," Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Proposed Rule, 49 Fed Reg 40533 (1984), and the commentary suggests that HUD
intended to impose a "nondelegable" duty on owners. See id at 40528-29. In response to strong
objections over the nondelegability interpretation, HUD added the "scope of authority" lan-
guage.The comments to the final rule show that HUD clearly rejected the nondelegable duty:
[I]t is not HUD's inteni to impose absolute liability on any principal; the intent, in propos-
ing [§ 103.20], was to follow the law enunciated by the courts in recent Fair Housing Act
cases with respect to the liability of a principal for acts of an agent.... HUD has revised the
language of [§ 103.20] to provide that a complaint may be filed against a directing or con-
trolling person with respect to the discriminatory acts of another only if the other person
was acting within the scope of his or her authority as employee or agent of the directing or
controlling person.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Final Rule, 53 Fed Reg 24185 (1998) (empha-
sis added). HUD affirmed its commitment to agency principles in restructuring its complaint
procedures in 1989, see Department of Housing and Urban Development, Implementation of the
Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988,54 Fed Reg 3232,3261 (1989), and also in 1999. See note
115.
Despite the clear text and comments on section 103.20, there have been several HUD adju-
dications in which the administrative law judge has found that the FHA creates a nondelegable
duty in owners. See, for example, HUD v Schmid, 1999 WL 521524 at *5 (HUD AiL July 15,
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This provision, however, governs only those claims filed with the
Secretary of HUD; the regulations make no mention of who may or
may not file a civil claim in district court. Nevertheless, courts have
found that the administrative and civil remedies should be interpreted
as "alternate analogous remedies."'1 7 In Marr v Rife,8' for example, one
issue before the court was the burden of proof in civil FHA claims."9
While the Act itself does not state which party has the burden in civil
claims, in administrative claims the complainant carries the burden'2
In response to the plaintiffs argument that the burden of proof should
shift to the defendants once a prima facie case was made, the court
stated:
1999) ("The duty of property owners not to discriminate is non-delegable."), citing US v Gorman
Towers Apartment, 2 Fair Housing-Fair Lending (P-H) 15942 at 15942.4 (1994). These cases
clearly contradict HUD's own binding regulations and should be rejected outright. See St Luke's
Methodist Hospital v Thompson, 182 F Supp 2d 765,775 (N D Iowa 2001) ("When ... the issue is
whether the agency has erred in interpreting its own regulations, the plain meaning of a statute
or regulation controls, if there is one, regardless of an agency's interpretation").
Moreover, even if the regulation commanding the application of agency principles were am-
biguous, the adjudicatory orders purporting to establish that the FHA imposes a nondelegable
duty are a circumvention of the rulemaking process. While administrative agencies have wide
discretion to decide whether to proceed by rulemaking or adjudication, "there may be situations
where the reliance on adjudication would amount to an abuse of discretion" See NLRB v Bell
Aerospace Co, 416 US 267,294 (1974). One example of an abuse of discretion is when the adju-
dicatory order attempts to resurrect a requirement that was previously rejected by a notice-and-
comment rulemaking. See Patel v INS, 638 F2d 1199 (9th Cir 1980) (striking down the INS's ad-
judicatory imposition of a visa requirement that had been considered and rejected from a previ-
ous rulemaking); William D. Araiza, Agency Adjudication, the Importance of Facts, and the Limi-
tations of Labels, 57 Wash & Lee L Rev 351 (2000) (validating the Patel approach). See also Na-
tional Family Planning & Reproductive Health Association v Sullivan, 979 F2d 227,240 (DC Cir
1992) (striking down the HHS's adjudicatory lifting of a referral ban when the previous rule dis-
allowing the referrals had been promulgated in rulemaking); Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative
Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 Duke L J 381, 396 ("If a second rule repudiates or is
irreconcilable with a prior legislative rule, the second rule must be an amendment of the first;
and, of course, an amendment to a legislative rule must itself be legislative.").
As in Patel, the HUD adjudicatory orders finding that the FHA creates a nondelegable duty
contradict the rejected proposal in promulgating § 103.20. The orders, therefore, represent a cir-
cumvention of the rulemaking process, and should be struck down. Indeed, "[t]o sanction any
other course would render the requirements of [the Administrative Procedure Act] basically su-
perfluous in legislative rulemaking by permitting agencies to alter their requirements for af-
fected public members at will through the ingenious device of 'reinterpreting' their own rule."
Sullivan, 979 F2d at 231-32.
117 Holley, 258 F3d at 1131. See also Gladstone Realtors v Village of Bellwood, 441 US 91,
104 (1979) (finding that "Congress intended to provide all victims of Title VIII violations two al-
ternate mechanisms by which to seek redress"); Mart, 503 F2d at 739 (analogizing the civil rem-
edy under the Act to the administrative remedy). But see Walker, 976 F2d at 904 (concluding
that because the regulation only purports to govern administrative claims, by its own terms it
does not apply to civil claims).
115 503 F2d 735 (6th Cir 1974).
119 Id at 738 (concluding that it was necessary to rule on whether "the District Judge erred
in holding that plaintiffs had the burden of proving their case by a preponderance of the evi-
dence").
120 See id at 739.
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Although [the Act's provision of a civil remedy] fails to indicate
the burden of proof to be applied, it would be anomalous for a
different burden of proof to apply [in the civil remedy] than is
applied [in the administrative remedy]. By adopting [the] sug-
gested burden of proof, we would virtually eliminate any reason
for seeking voluntary enforcement [by the Secretary of HUD]
under [the administrative procedures].'2M
Likewise, it would be anomalous to read the standard of liability
in civil FHA claims to be a nondelegable duty while reading the stan-
dard in administrative claims to be agency principles. In addition, if
the standard of liability for civil claims is more favorable to plaintiffs
than the standard in the administrative remedy, then, as with the bur-
den of proof at issue in Marr, the Secretary of HUD would be dis-
couraged from initiating administrative claims. Therefore, HUD's
regulations counsel courts to import traditional agency principles into
their interpretation of the standard of liability under the Act.
C. The Interpretive History of the Act Does Not Favor Imposition
of a Nondelegable Duty
An examination of the cases supporting imposition of a nondele-
gable duty under the FHA reveals that the rule's pedigree is not as
strong as it may initially appear. First, because the rule is an alternative
holding to a traditional agency analysis, and because juries have typi-
cally found owners to be liable on the basis of traditional agency prin-
ciples, the courts rarely have had occasion to apply a nondelegable
duty. Second, the cases that Real Estate Development cited in support
of the nondelegable duty do not stand for that rule. Instead, they
clearly applied traditional agency principles. Because every subsequent
application of the nondelegable duty can ultimately be traced to Real
Estate Development, this fact impugns the entire line of cases.
1. The problem of alternative holdings.
Examining the history of the nondelegability rule in FHA litiga-
tion, Judge Widener of the Fourth Circuit argued in dissent in Walker
that the cases cited by the majority finding that the FHA creates a
nondelegable duty did not, in fact, have occasion to apply the rule.
'n
Instead, he argued that the courts decided each of these cases by the
application of traditional agency principles.'2 Once the owner was held
121 Id.
122 Walker, 976 F2d at 907-08 (Widener dissenting) (dissenting on the grounds that the Fair
Housing Act did not create a nondelegable duty on the owner).
123 Id. Judge Widener examined, among others, Real Estate Development, 347 F Supp 776,
Marr, 503 F2d 735, and Youritan, 370 F Supp 643, concluding that he was "aware of no case
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liable on the basis of agency principles, the court's determination that
he or she had a nondelegable duty was extraneous to the holding9
Widener argued that the "rule," therefore, was nothing but dicta.'2
Real Estate Development provides an excellent example of Judge
Widener's argument. In that case, the court noted that the managers'
"acts and statements, made within the scope of their agency, are at-
tributable to the defendants, whose duty to comply with the law is
non-delegable."'29 The court, therefore, first found that the managers
were agents of the owners, and that their acts were within the scope of
authority. It could have ended its inquiry there; the owners were liable
based on an application of the traditional principles of agency law. In-
stead it continued, finding that the owners had a nondelegable duty to
avoid discrimination. This finding was unnecessary to the outcome of
the case.
The court's approach in Real Estate Development is typical of the
approach used by most subsequent courts that have found that the
FHA creates a nondelegable duty.'2 Therefore, while Walker itself
necessarily held that the FHA creates a nondelegable duty, very few
other cases have.29 As Judge Widener observed, the case law falls "far
short ... of establishing a general rule" that the FHA imposes a non-
delegable duty on owners.19
2. The early cases applied agency principles.
Moreover, in Real Estate Development, the first case to read the
FHA to create a nondelegable duty, the cases that the court cited for
that proposition do not, in fact, stand for it. In Williamson, the defen-
dants owned and operated an apartment complex.' In leasing the
apartments, a desk clerk and assistant manager unlawfully discrimi-
nated against two black women. 0
In finding the owner liable, the court undertook a traditional
agency analysis:
squarely adopting [the non-delegability rule]."
124 Walker, 976 F2d at 907-OS.
125 Id at 907 ("The cases fall far short, however, of establishing a general rule that tradi-
tional principles of agency law have no application [under the FHA].').
126 347 F Supp at 785.
127 See note 123.
128 See, for example, Walker, 976 F2d at 904 ("Here we adopt the general rule applied by
other federal courts that the duty of a property owner not to discriminate in the leasing or sale of
that property is non-delegable'); Holley, 258 F3d at 1131 ("[O]ur Court has recognized that the
duty to obey the laws relating to racial discrimination under the FHA is non-delegable.").
129 Walker, 976 F2d at 907 (Widener dissenting).
130 339 F Supp 1146,1149 (N D 11972).
131 Id.
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[The clerk] was admittedly an agent of [the management com-
pany] .... What she said and did was with full knowledge ... of
[the manager], who had the authority to approve or disapprove
leases. The other defendants are chargeable with her acts and she
participated in the violations found to have occurred. . 2
The application of traditional agency principles could not be
clearer. First, the court found that the manager was an agent of the
owners, and that her actions were within her authority. Second, the
court made no mention of a nondelegable duty imposed by the FHA.
Likewise, in Reddoch, the court also applied traditional agency
principles. The defendants were the owners and the manager of an
apartment complex. The manager followed an explicit policy of ra-
cial discrimination and instructed her subordinates to do the same.114
At the bench trial, the court held all of the defendants liable, finding:
[The manager], as an agent of the defendants, is authorized to
represent [the owners].... Her acts and statements, made within
the scope of her agency, and made with the acquiescence of the
owners, are attributable to the [owners], who, at least, failed to
take adequate steps to assure that she would comply with the
law. 
3
Although the court's language is somewhat ambiguous, several
factors indicate that the court did not apply a nondelegable duty. First,
unlike the situation in Real Estate Development, the owners in Red-
doch knew about and brooked their agent's discrimination. It is clear
that the owners likely would have been directly liable for the discrimi-
nation on a negligence theory,' thus avoiding the agency/non-
delegable duty debate entirely. Second, the agency relationship is ex-
pressly discussed, with the court finding that the manager's discrimina-
tion was within her scope of authority, a finding that was unnecessary
if her liability was determined according to a nondelegable duty. Third,
the language indicates that the owners might have delegated their
duty under the FHA. The phrase "at least" in the sentence indicates
that the owners could have instructed the manager not to discriminate,
or taken other steps adequate to make her discrimination an act with-
out authority. At most they could have assured her compliance with
the law; at least they could have taken preventive measures adequate
to shield them from liability. And fourth, the court did not undertake
an examination of the Act, nor did it make a single policy argument
132 Id at 1149.
133 No 6541-71-P, slip op at 2 (S D Ala Jan 27,1972).
134 Id at 7.
135 Id at 28.
136 See note 26.
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for the imposition of what would have been, at the time, an unprece-
dented rule in civil rights law.
D. The Policy of the Act Does Not Support Application of a
Nondelegable Duty
Finally, courts also examine the legislation's policy to determine
whether it supports the imposition of a nondelegable duty. If the stat-
ute imposes an obligation that is so important to the community that
the owner should not be permitted to transfer it to another, courts will
find that the duty is nondelegable. '
The FHA contains a nebulous sentence describing the impor-
tance of ending housing discrimination: "It is the policy of the United
States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing
throughout the United States?'1 Despite the imprecision of this
statement and its facial inapplicability to the standard of liability,'39 it is
unquestionable that the goal of ending housing discrimination is an
important one. Nevertheless, precedent indicates that the obligation
created under the Act should not be read to be nondelegable. This
precedent comes from the Court's interpretations of two other civil
rights statutes: 42 USC § 1981, enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment
right of equal protection,'4' and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, prohibiting discrimination in employment.''
Like the FHA, each of these statutes embodies the congressional
policy to deter and compensate for civil rights violations."2 Also like
the FHA, each of these statutes has been interpreted broadly."3 But
neither of these statutes imposes a nondelegable duty. Instead, § 1981
137 See note 32 and accompanying text. See also Chapman v Mutual Service Casualty Insur-
ance Co, 35 F Supp 2d 699,706-07 (E D Wis 1999) ("Essentially, the non-delegable duty excep-
tion is based on the theory that certain responsibilities are so important that an employer or
principal should not be permitted to bargain away the risks involved in performance.").
138 42 USC § 3601.
139 One court has interpreted the F-IA's statement of policy as indicating merely that the
Act was not limited in regional scope. See Groome Resources Ltd, LLC v Parish of Jefferson, 234
F3d 192,210 (5th Cir 2000) ("Congress acted in response to the recognition that ... there is a na-
tional effect on housing materials, economic development, and growth of certain restricted ar-
eas.").
140 42 USC § 1981 (1994).
141 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-532 § 701,78 Stat 253 (1964), codi-
fied as amended at 42 USC § 2000e (1994).
142 See Catherine Fisk and Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Remedies: Vicarious
Liability Under Yitle VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 Wim & Mary Bill of Rts J 755,756 (1999)
(observing that the civil rights laws "impose[ ] civil liability so as to deter wrongs and compen-
sate injured individuals").
143 General Building, 458 US at 408 ("[Olur prior decisions ... have consistently given
§ 1981 as broad an interpretation as its language permits.") (Marshall dissenting) (citing cases);
Griggs v Duke Power Co, 401 US 424,429-36 (1971) (finding that Title VII should be interpreted
broadly to achieve equal employment opportunity).
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has been interpreted to provide for vicarious liability pursuant to tra-
ditional agency principles,'" and Title VII has been interpreted accord-
ing to a variation of traditional agency principles, without reference to
a nondelegable duty.141 Considering the similarities among § 1981,'" Ti-
tle VII, 4 ' and Title VIII, each statute should be interpreted to provide
for a similar standard of liability.
144 General Building, 458 US at 396 (finding that in enacting 42 USC § 1981 Congress "did
not intend to make [employers] the guarantors of the workers' rights as against third parties who
would infringe them").
145 Burlington Industries, 524 US at 754-65 (although noting that the issue of nondelegabil-
ity was not before it, applying agency principles to determine whether a supervisor was liable for
the sexual harassment of a subordinate, and finding that, in certain cases, the employer has an af-
firmative defense to the supervisor's harassment, a finding inconsistent with a nondelegable
duty). See also Rebecca Hanner White, Vicarious and Personal Liability for Employment Dis-
crimination, 30 Ga L Rev 509, 562 n 125 (1996) (noting that a nondelegability approach to Title
VII is inconsistent with its text and legislative history).
The analogy of Title VII to Title VIII is a particularly interesting one. In Faragher and Bur-
lington Industries, the Court found that the issue of whether a supervisor's sexual harassment of
a subordinate is within the scope of the supervisor's authority is typically a question of fact.
Faragher, 524 US at 757; Burlington Industries, 524 US at 798. In each case, the Court then turned
to the "aided in the agency" exception to the scope-of-authority rule. Faragher, 524 US at 802-10;
Burlington Industries, 524 US at 760-65. In Faragher, 524 US at 802-03, the Court found that in
some regard, a supervisor is always aided in the agency when he or she discriminates against a
subordinate by virtue of the fact that the job allows the supervisor to come into contact with the
subordinate. Moreover, the supervisor has some power over subordinates insofar as the employ-
ees under him or her "may well be reluctant to accept the risks of blowing the whistle." Id at 803.
Yet the Court also found that the text of Title VII and precedent interpreting it precluded a
finding of absolute employer liability for the harassment committed by its supervisors. Id at 804.
In addition, the Court also found that Title VII's policy of deterrence outweighed the policy of
compensation. Id at 805. These considerations led to a distinction in the legal standard to be ap-
plied based on whether the employee suffered a "tangible employment action." Id at 807. A tan-
gible employment action is one that "constitutes a significant change in employment status, such
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a significant change in benefits." Burlington Industries, 524 US at 761. When a
harassing supervisor undertakes discrimination without a tangible employment action, the em-
ployer may raise an affirmative defense by showing that it had a sexual harassment policy and
the plaintiff failed to take advantage of it. Id at 807. In the case where an employee suffers a tan-
gible employment action at the hands of a supervisor, the employer is always vicariously liable
for the supervisor's discrimination according to the "aided in the agency" standard. Faragher, 524
US at 807; Burlington Industries, 524 US at 762-65.
While neither Faragher nor Burlington Industries applies directly to Title VIII, the cases raise
interesting questions for the FHA: Is a supervisor in the employment context analogous to an
owner in the housing context? Is a tangible employment action analogous to a denial of housing?
Can violations of Title VIII be effectively deterred by nondiscrimination policies? No federal
court has considered these and related questions, perhaps because the question of whether to
apply agency principles or a nondelegable duty under the Act is logically antecedent to their
resolution.
146 Sections 1981 and 1982 have very similar legislative histories, as both are derived from
§ 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See General Building, 458 US at 384. Section 1982 is often
treated as the more general statutory precursor to the FHA. See Caplan, Comment, 48 Rutgers
L Rev at 596 (cited in note 88). Therefore, just as § 1981 was interpreted not to impose a non-
delegable duty, the FHA should not either. Id at 594-97.
147 See, for example, Metropolitan Housing Development Corp v Village of Arlington
Heights, 558 F2d 1283, 1289-90 (7th Cir 1977) (reasoning that because the antidiscrimination ob-
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To be sure, the Court's interpretations of the standard of vicarious
liability under these statutes have depended on the particular text and
policies of each act.' Nevertheless, the text and policies of these stat-
utes do not reveal that their prohibitions are somehow less important
than the prohibition against discrimination in housing. It is difficult to
draw the conclusion that the typical housing discrimination claim is so
important that the owner should have a nondelegable duty, but, for ex-
ample, plaintiffs' claims that they were prohibited from making a con-
tract because of unlawful discrimination 9 are not important enough to
merit the same treatment.
Even if the policies of the Act are somehow more important than
other civil rights statutes, there are reasons to think that the imposi-
tion of a nondelegable duty on owners does not significantly advance
the Act's policies. Courts should consider the particularities of FHA
claims in their assessment of the deterrent and compensatory effects
of the nondelegability rule. First, because compensatory damage
awards under the FHA are typically small, owners have little incentive
to monitor their agents acting without authority. Second, because of
the small damage awards, it is less likely that an employee who dis-
criminates will be judgment proof
1. The nondelegability rule does not serve the policy
of deterrence.
The first policy justification of the nondelegability rule typically
offered is that it leads to more deterrence than does the agency re-
gime.'5° Under the nondelegability rule, owners will be encouraged to
jectives of Title VII are parallel to the goals of Title VIII, proof of discriminatory effect will suf-
fice to show a violation of Title VIII, just as it is sufficient under Title VII).
148 Title VII states in pertinent part that "[tihe term 'employer' means a person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce ... and any agent of such a person." 42 USC § 2000e. In Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57 (1986), the Court relied on the Title VII definition in its
conclusion that traditional agency principles applied to that statute. Id at 72. Although Title VIII
itself does not have this exact language, HUD's regulations provide a strong analogy to Title VII.
Like the statutory language of Title VII, the language of HUD's regulations counsel for the ap-
plication of agency principles to Title VIII. See Part III.B.
The absence of the "agency" language in the text of the FHA itself does not provide evi-
dence that Congress intended to impose a nondelegable duty on owners. Instead, it tends to
show that Congress intended not to expose innocent owners to liability for their employees' dis-
crimination at all. See Gebser v Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 US 274,283 (1998)
(basing its holding that Title IX does not impose liability on school districts for actions of a non-
supervisory teacher in part on the fact that Title IX lacks any reference to agency principles).
Because of precedent, HUD regulations, and policy considerations, this Comment does not argue
that Title VIII should be so interpreted.
149 42 USC § 1981 provides that, among other civil rights, "[a]ll persons within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and en-
force contracts."
150 See Part II.B3.a.
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monitor each of their employees, even agents acting without authority,
thereby affording the employees fewer opportunities to violate the
FHA.
51
But the theoretical deterrent value of the nondelegability rule is
overstated because a breach of the nondelegable duty provides only
compensatory damages under the FHA. '5 Compensatory damages are
generally much smaller than punitive damages under the FHA. '"
While compensatory damages undoubtedly serve some deterrent
function, their primary focus is on plaintiff compensation.' Punitive
damages, on the other hand, are designed to punish those who violate
the Act and to deter future violations.151 Owners' liability for punitive
damages under the FHA is determined according to a variation of
traditional agency principles."' Because of the large amount of these
punitive awards, owners are already encouraged to take affirmative
steps, such as issuing instructions, policies, and manuals, to ensure that
their agents comply with the FHA. The relatively small compensatory
damage awards, when compared to the high costs of monitoring
agents acting without authority,"' likely do not provide owners with
sufficient incentives to monitor their employees above what the tradi-
tional agency regime for punitive damages already requires.
In fact, the nondelegability regime might create less deterrence
than a traditional agency analysis. This possibility exists because
agents acting without authority have greater incentive to avoid viola-
tions of the Act under a traditional agency analysis than under the
nondelegability regime.
As established, under an agency regime owners have an incentive
to monitor their agents acting with authority because they will be li-
able if they do not. Presuming the costs of liability outweigh the costs
of monitoring agents acting with authority, owners will, therefore,
avoid liability by monitoring their agents acting with authority. Agents
acting without authority will then themselves be deterred from violat-
ing the FHA because they alone will be liable for their discrimination.
151 Id.
152 See note 6.
153 See Moran, 36 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 344 n 55 (cited in note 6) (noting that compensa-
tory damages "rarely exceed a few thousand dollars and often are considerably less").
154 See id at 285 (noting that compensatory damages only partially serve the policy of deter-
rence and are insufficient to deter FHA violations).
155 Id at 284 ("The purpose of punitive damages are [sic] to punish the wrongdoer and to
deter future conduct by the tortfeasor and others.").
156 See note 6.
157 These costs are likely to be high because, by definition, the agent acting without author-
ity is acting beyond the control of the principal. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228(2)
("Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in kind from that
authorized.").
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Under either regime owners will have little incentive to monitor
their agents acting without authority because of the high costs of
monitoring and small size of the award. With a nondelegability regime,
then, agents acting without authority will be deterred less than they
would under an agency regime, because owners will be liable for the
agents' discrimination.u While owners may seek contribution from the
agents acting without authority,09 they will do so only if the compensa-
tory damages are larger than the costs of the contribution action. The
situation where the damages are larger than the costs of the contribu-
tion action seems unlikely given that compensatory damages under
the FHA will be relatively low. Therefore, it is possible that more dis-
crimination could occur under the nondelegability rule than under a
traditional agency analysis."
2. The nondelegability rule narrowly serves the policy
of compensation.
The second policy justification for the nondelegability rule is that
it provides for more instances of plaintiff compensation than does the
agency regime. 1 The traditional agency approach would leave plain-
tiffs' harms uncompensated when agents acting without authority are
judgment proof '6 Unlike the traditional agency analysis, the nondele-
gability rule provides for a greater chance of plaintiff compensation
because it also prevents owners from shifting responsibility to agents
acting without authority.63 By so doing, it ensures plaintiff compensa-
tion in the situation where the agent is unable to pay the damage
award.
The particular features of the FHA, however, cast doubt on the
conclusion that the nondelegability regime actually does create a sig-
nificantly greater chance of plaintiff compensation. As noted, compen-
satory damages are relatively small under the FHA.6' Because of
158 See Sykes, 93 Yale L J at 1236 (cited in note 95) (noting that a principal's assumption of
an agent's liability "may lead to smaller investments by the agent in efforts to avoid judgments").
159 See Walker, 976 F2d at 905 n 9 ("Tlhe owner will not be subject to liability for the full
amount of all successful claims to the extent that contribution from other liable parties may off-
set some, or all, of the payment for which the owner is responsible.").
160 It is, of course, possible that other factors will contribute to the agent's willingness to dis-
criminate, namely, the possibility of facing adverse employment actions and negative reputa-
tional effects as a result of the discrimination. Note, however, as in Walker and Matchmaker,
agents often discriminate despite these results, even if the owner has specifically instructed them
not to.
161 See Part II.B.3.b.
162 See Sykes, 93 Yale L J at 1242 (cited in note 94) ("[T]he choice between personal liabil-
ity and vicarious liability will affect ... the allocation of losses between the principal-agent en-
terprise and the victim of the agent's wrongs.").
163 Id.
164 See note 153 and accompanying text.
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these small awards, the probability that the agent acting without au-
thority will be unable to pay is greatly reduced. As one court has ob-
served: "In the great majority of cases we may assume that real estate
agents will not ... be judgment proof"' ' If agents will be able to sat-
isfy the compensatory award in the great majority of cases, the non-
delegability rule does not materially advance the FHA's policy of
compensation.
Undoubtedly, there is a theoretical class of aggrieved plaintiffs
who will not receive compensatory damages under the Act as inter-
preted according to traditional agency principles who would be com-
pensated under a nondelegability regime. This small benefit is offset,
however, by the fact that under the nondelegability rule there may be
less deterrence, a fact leading to more instances of discrimination.
While the nondelegability rule will moderately serve the policy of
compensation, it is only at the price of more discrimination. Because
the policy of deterrence outweighs the policy of compensation,"' this is
a high price indeed.
CONCLUSION
The continued imposition of a nondelegable duty under the FHA
against owners is inadvisable. All of the interpretive sources counsel
for an abandonment of the nondelegable duty approach. The text of
the Act does not support the creation of a nondelegable duty. In addi-
tion, HUD's regulations counsel for the application of agency princi-
ples. Likewise, the precedent does not establish that the Act should be
interpreted to impose a nondelegable duty. Finally, although the Act is
to be interpreted broadly, the imposition of a nondelegable duty is too
broad a measure considering its relationship to other civil rights stat-
utes and the marginal benefits it offers.
165 Walker, 976 F2d at 905 n 9. Interestingly, the court in Walker nevertheless applied the
nondelegability rule. But according to the court's statement, the circuitous route of damages paid
will increase the overall costs of the litigation without producing a significant benefit to either
plaintiffs or the public.
166 See 42 USC § 3601; note 145.
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